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Exclusive Contracts and Hospital-Based
Physicians
Michael K. Yarbrought
I. Introduction
For many years hospitals and physicians who practice pri-
marily in hospitals, have been free to establish relations and to
structure their activities almost without scrutiny. Hospitals and
their internal organizations were shielded from external review
for several reasons: there was a relative shortage of doctors and
hospitals; health care costs were relatively modest; and the pub-
lic service aspect of the profession of healing the sick insulated it
from reproach.
The events of the past twenty years, however, have caused a
number of concerned parties to view hospitals in a more prag-
matic light. This changed perspective was brought about princi-
pally by the workings of the bedrock marketplace forces of sup-
ply and demand. Paramount among these factors is the increase
in the number of physicians in the country and the predictions
for a future oversupply.1 As the number of physicians increases
there will be heightened competition for patients and access to
hospital privileges and facilities.
A second key factor leading to the recent critical analysis
given hospital-physician structuring is the increased involve-
ment of the state and federal government in the reimbursement
of medical costs. Government entry into reimbursement has led
to increased concern over rising medical costs and, consequently,
to calls to curtail these rising costs.2 As a result, hospitals are
t B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., Northwestern University; Partner, Porter,
Wright, Morris & Arthur, Columbus, Ohio.
1. See Katz, Warner & Whittington, The Supply of Physicians and Physicians' In-
comes: Some Projections, 2 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 227 (1977-1978) (number of
active physicians per 100,000 population predicted to increase by one-third in the decade
ending in 1985); N.Y. Times, April 14, 1980, at A16, col. 1 (from 1970 to 1978, number of
physicians in United States increased by 17%).
2. The government policies include certificate of need controls over entry and other
1
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being required to justify and limit costs.
Accommodating the interplay (some would say collision) be-
tween these and other competing market forces has led to in-
creased dissatisfaction by those who have been excluded or "dis-
advantaged" by hospital decisions. The hospital-physician
relationship that has led to the greatest amount of litigation and
dissatisfaction is the exclusive contract between hospitals and
physicians.3 Such exclusive contracts are primarily between hos-
pitals and hospital-based physician specialists such as anesthesi-
ologists, radiologists, pathologists and emergency room physi-
cians. The central aspect of all these exclusive contracts is the
same: physicians who are parties to the agreement provide speci-
fied services to the hospital to the exclusion of those not parties
to the contract.
While this is a constant theme in cases involving exclusive
contracts, the connection between the hospital and the favored
group may take myriad forms. Arrangements may, for instance,
alternatively characterize the physician as an employee or an in-
dependent contractor. The financial arrangements may vary tre-
mendously, as physicians opt to retain independent billing, re-
ceive fees for services, or receive a percentage of the gross.
Sometimes the "details" of the arrangement will have no effect
whatsoever on the merits of any challenge; yet in other in-
stances, these "details" may determine the outcome.
II. Application of Antitrust Laws
A. General Application
Despite the steady development of competitive forces in the
hospital marketplace, it has been only recently that antitrust
law has recognized challenges to arrangements involving health
care professionals. Previously, the practice of medicine was ex-
federal and state laws that are designed to limit hospital revenues. See Symposium: Cer-
tificate-of-Need Laws in Health Planning, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 1. See generally D.S. AB-
ERNATHY & D.A. PEARSON, REGULATING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PuBLc
POLICY (1979); Lewin, Somers, & Somers, State Health Cost Regulation: Structure and
Administration, 6 U. TOL. L. REv. 647 (1974-1975).
3. See Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 536 F. Supp. 1065,
1069 after amended complaint, 552 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd in part, afl'd in
part on other grounds, 721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Dolan & Ralston, Hospital
Admitting Privilege and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REv. 707, 787-88 (1981).
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cluded from antitrust application based on the "learned profes-
sion" defense," because the practice of a profession was not
"commerce" for purposes of the antitrust laws. Recent deci-
sions,5 however, have abolished this exemption. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court recently applied the standard of per se illegality to
a price fixing arrangement within the medical profession itself.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society7 made clear that
the antitrust laws apply to the conduct of the medical profes-
sion.8 Faced with the unequivocal holding of the Supreme Court
in Maricopa, the medical profession and hospitals must be pre-
pared to evaluate their conduct based solely upon the competi-
tive model of the marketplace for hospital services.
B. Jurisdiction
Even after the "learned profession" exemption was abol-
ished by the Supreme Court,9 medical defendants in antitrust
cases sought to dismiss antitrust claims on the ground that the
challenged conduct did not have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. 10 Early in the quest for dismissals, however,
hospitals were stung by the Supreme Court's decision in Hospi-
tal Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital," in which the
Court, analyzing a variety of factors, determined that a hospital
can be shown to have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.1 2 Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that even local
4. E.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S.
773 (1975); see also FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Baseball
Club, Inc. v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). See
generally Heitler, Antitrust, Restraint of Trade, and Unfair Business Practices: Impact
on Physicians, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 443 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975); United States
v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1173, 1197-98 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 422
U.S. 1031 (1975).
6. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347-48 (1982).
7. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
8. Id. at 347-48.
9. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 787.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338-39
(1952).
11. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
12. Id. at 744 (factors the Court considered were purchases of out-of-state supplies,
revenue from out-of-state insurance companies, management fees paid to out-of-state
parent corporations and multi-million dollar out-of-state financing).
1984]
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medical activity in a hospital may be sufficient to invoke the ju-
risdictional prerequisites of the antitrust laws, defendants were
given revived hope for this defense in Capili v. Shott.18 In
Capili, the Fourth Circuit found that there had been an insuffi-
cient showing of the hospital's effect on interstate commerce.1 4
Absent a showing of a substantial and adverse effect on com-
merce, the antitrust laws do not apply.'5 Today, Capili stands as
practically the sole support for a claim that a hospital does not
have a substantial and adverse effect on interstate commerce.
Many decisions hold that a hospital's activities satisfy the juris-
dictional requirements of the antitrust laws.' 6
III. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Disrtrict No. 2
When analyzing exclusive contracts today, the immediate
and primary focus must be upon the recent United States Su-
preme Court decision in Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Dis-
trict No. 2.'7 In Hyde, the Supreme Court denied an anesthesiol-
ogist's claim that the exclusive contract in question was an
illegal tying arrangement.18 This long-awaited decision provides
a useful vehicle to begin to analyze the future of exclusive con-
tract litigation in the hospital context.
Dr. Edwin G. Hyde was an anesthesiologist who practiced in
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. Dr. Hyde applied for admission to
the East Jefferson medical staff and received favorable recom-
mendations. However, the hospital board voted to deny staff
privileges to Dr. Hyde due to the fact that anesthesia services
13. 620 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1980).
14. Id. at 439.
15. E.g., Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. at 743; United
States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954); Atlantic Cleaners & Dy-
ers Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-
Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1983).
16. See, e.g., Tarleton v. Meharry Medical College, 717 F.2d 1523, 1531-32 (6th Cir.
1983); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 1980);
Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians, 561 F. Supp 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d
1007 (2d Cir. 1984); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 876 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd
mem., 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982). But see Furlong v. Long
Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1983) (more specific jurisidictional facts
needed to satisfy the jurisidictional element of an antitrust claim).
17. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
18. Id. at 1567-68.
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were supplied to the hospital by Roux & Associates (Roux)
under an exclusive contract. Under the contract Roux deter-
mines the fee for the services rendered. Patients are then jointly
billed for the anesthesia services provided by the doctor and
those provided by the hospital. After certain small deductions,
fifty percent of the gross receipts of the department are sent to
Roux."e
The district court rejected Hyde's claim that this arrange-
ment represented an illegal tie under the antitrust laws on the
basis that the hospital did not have sufficient market power over
the tying product (operating rooms) in the market in which it
competed.20 The court relied upon the fact that large numbers of
Jefferson Parish residents went to other hospitals in the New
Orleans area.2 Thus, in the view of the district court, Hyde
failed to show that East Jefferson Hospital "dominated the
market."
So, too, the district court accepted the hospital's contention
that the exclusive contract between the hospital and Roux was
to ensure the continued and quality care of their patients.2 ' The
court found the following factors relevant:
Specifically the system insures twenty-four hour anesthesiology
coverage, aids in the control and standardization of procedures
and the efficient and less costly operation of the department; it
lends flexibility to the scheduling of operations because it is not
necessary to accommodate physicians with outside commitments;
it permits the physicians, nurses, and other technicians in the de-
partment to develop a work routine and a proficiency with the
equipment they use in patient treatment; and it increases the
Board's ability to monitor the medical standards excercised be-
19. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. 532, 536 (E.D. La.
1981), rev'd, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
20. Id. at 544.
21. Id. at 539-40.
22. Id. at 540-41, 545. In the past, state court decisions have primarily justified ex-
clusive contracts for this reason. See Dattilo v. Tuscon Gen. Hosp., 23 Ariz. App. 392,
533 P.2d 700 (1975); Centeno v. Roseville Community Hosp., 107 Cal. App. 3d 62, 167
Cal. Rptr. 183 (1979); Letsch v. Northern San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 246 Cal. App.
2d 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1966); Blank v. Palo Alto-Stanford Hosp. Center, 234 Cal.
App. 2d 377, 44 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1965); Rush v. City of St. Petersburg, 205 So.2d 11 (FI.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Benell v. City of Virginia, 258 Minn. 559, 104 N.W.2d 633 (1960);
Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n., 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1131 (1974).
1984]
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cause there are fewer individuals involved, maintenance of equip-
ment is simplified and equipment breakdowns are minimized by
limiting use to one group of physicians.2 3
The court deferred to the hospital's contention and found that
these benefits rendered the exclusive contract reasonable.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed primarily because it
did not require dominance in the tying product's market. 4 The
Fifth Circuit initially noted that no party had seriously disputed
the existence of a tying arrangement.25 Once a tie was found to
exist, the court of appeals addressed the second element of an
illegal tying arrangement: whether the hospital had sufficient ec-
onomic power over the tying product (operating rooms) to affect
competition in the tied product market (anesthesia services)."
Although the trial court had required "dominance" over the ty-
ing product,27 the Fifth Circuit required the plaintiff to show
merely that there had been an "appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product. '28 Moreover, in order to deter-
mine whether an appreciable restraint had occurred, the Fifth
Circuit examined the relevant geographic market in which the
hospital operated. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district
court's broad definition of the relevant market. The trial court
defined a substantial portion of the New Orleans area as the
proper geographic market of the hospital. The Fifth Circuit lim-
ited the relevant geographic market to the East Bank of Jeffer-
son Parish. 9 Using this limited market definition, the court of
appeals had no difficulty in finding that there had been a suffi-
cient restraint of trade in the market for the tied product (anes-
23. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. at 540.
24. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'g
513 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. La. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
25. Id. at 289. Both lower courts found that there were two separate products in the
tying arrangement. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. This statement is some-
what curious in light of the fact that the briefs in support of the hospital in the Supreme
Court argue strenuously that no tie existed. Brief for the Petitioners at 11, 41-42, Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (No. 82-1031). So, too, the
failure of proof as to an actual tying arrangement was argued before the Supreme Court
in early November 1983 during the oral arguments in Hyde.
26. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d at 291.
27. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. at 542; see supra text
accompanying notes 19-21.
28. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d at 289.
29. Id.
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thesia services),s°
Having found that economic power over the tying product
existed, the Fifth Circuit also held that the profit sharing ar-
rangement between the hospital and the anesthesiologists was
anticompetitive,31 particularly where the anesthesiologists relied
heavily on nurse anesthetists5 s Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that
the true purpose behind this contract was economic gain, and
not quality medical care.33 Finally, the Fifth Circuit set forth the
standard by which it would judge tying arrangements: "An ille-
gal tying arrangement will never be excused if there is a less re-
strictive way to accomplish the end which the business justifica-
tion purports to serve. '' U Using this standard, the court
criticized each alleged justification for the tying arrangement in
question based on the existence of less restrictive alternatives.3 5
The court of appeals held that the exclusive contract was
illegal."
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of ap-
peals' decision, finding that, on the record before the Court,
30. Id. at 290.
31. Id. at 292. The Fifth Circuit found the primary purpose of the tie was economic
gain. The court discounted the quality of care rationales put forth in the case. It found
patients lacked free choice as to anesthesia services and that anesthesiologists were un-
fairly excluded from the hospital staff.
32. Id. Anesthesia services in East Jefferson Hospital are primarily undertaken by
nurse anesthetists. The anesthesiologists employed by Roux supervised the nurse anes-
thetists as needed, remaining with patients only for the more difficult operations. Id. at
288.
33. Id. at 295. In reaching their decision the court noted that "the profit motive
caused the hospital to hire nurse anesthetists in place of needed anesthesiologists, a
practice which dilutes the professional coverage available." Id. at 292.
34. Id. at 292 (citing Carps, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 47 (5th Cir.
1976)).
35. For example, the court suggests:
Monitoring of the professional competence of the anesthesiologists, another as-
serted business justification, can be accomplished by the much less restrictive
means of relying upon the medical staff, which is already set up to provide this
service. The need to place the responsibility for development and management of
the department upon one individual can also be accomplished without an exclu-
sive contract. In sum, appellees have failed to provide this Court with one reason
for the exclusive contract which could not be resolved by a much less drastic
solution.
36. Id. at 291-92.
7
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there was insufficient proof of an illegal tying arrangement.3 7
The Court split five to four, however, on the applicable legal
standard to apply. The majority reaffirmed the applicability, in
certain cases, of applying a per se rule to tying arrangements. 8
The Court noted that it was "far too late in the history of our
antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain
tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling compe-
tition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se.'-"9
The concurring opinion written by Justice O'Connor and
joined by Justices Burger, Powell and Rehnquist, advocated a
significant change in antitrust analysis by urging a rule of reason
approach to tying cases. 0 Justice O'Connor argued that "the
time has . . . come to abandon the per se label" on tying ar-
rangements." In the view of the concurring justices, tying ar-
rangements should be condemned only where there is a "sub-
stantial threat that the tying seller will acquire market power in
the tied-product market. 4
2
IV. The Effect of Hyde on the Tying Arrangement Approach
to Exclusive Contracts
Several key points emerge from an analysis of the Hyde de-
cision which affect the manner in which hospitals and hospital-
based physicians can structure their affairs. Unfortunately, the
degree of "guidance" offered by the Court's opinion is at best
minimal.
Existence of a Tie
The fundamental requirement of a claim of tying is that
there are two distinct products involved in the tying relation-
ship: a tying product and a tied product. In any tying claim,
therefore, a plaintiff must demonstrate that independent prod-
ucts were involved in the challenged arrangement.
In Hyde, both the district court and the court of appeals
37. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1567 (1984).
38. Id. at 1560.
39. Id. at 1556.
40. Id. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1572.
[Vol. 5:57
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presumed that two distinct products were involved: operating
rooms and anesthesia services.4 The conclusion that separate
products were involved finds support in the fact that the clinical
practice of anesthesiology is independent of hospital support
services to a significant degree. Anesthesiologists are called upon
to diagnose, treat and care for patients directly." Indeed, the
strongest support for the existence of two distinct products is
the fact that anesthesia services were provided to the hospital in
Hyde by a completely distinct economic entity.4 5 The anesthesia
group was not an employee of the hospital but rather was a sep-
arate business entity that billed its services separately from
those of the hospital.
By contrast, East Jefferson Hospital argued on appeal to
the Supreme Court that the hospital offered one service - oper-
ating rooms - and that ancillary support, such as anesthesia,
was incidental to this service. The hospital argued that it had
achieved "complete functional integration" and that the service
or product offered to the public was a vertically integrated
unit.4s In support of this position, commentators have endorsed
the concept that the hospital and medical staff are joint produc-
ers of one product: "hospitalization services. ' 47 This unitary
43. "The existence of a tying arrangement in this case has never been seriously dis-
puted by appellees, since it is clear that... we are dealing with two distinct services
which a buyer should be able to obtain separately." Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.
No. 2, 686 F.2d at 289.
"The provision of anesthesia services is a medical service separate from the other
services provided by the hospital. The hospital charges the patient a separate charge for
this service." Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. at 540.
44. Indeed, the American Society of Anesthesiologists argued in its amicus brief
before the Supreme Court in Hyde that anesthesiologists are fundamentally different
from other "hospital based" physicians such as pathologists and radiologists. The latter
groups do not practice in a direct physician-patient relationship; moreover, both patholo-
gists and radiologists do not need to be in the hospital itself to perform their services.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Society of Anesthesiologists, Inc. at 6, Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (No. 82-1031).
Interestingly, it may be possible to have a tying arrangement involving anesthesiolo-
gists but have no tie with the identical contract involving pathologists and radiologists.
See text accompanying note 55.
45. Cf., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp. ("Fortner I"), 394 U.S. 495
(1969), (credit and the sale of the product were viewed as different products).
46. Brief for Petitioners at 41-42, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.
Ct. 1551 (1984) (No. 82-1031).
47. Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Test-
ing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALuw. L. Rav. 595, 666 (1982). See also Pauly &
1984]
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product approach, it is argued, is consistent with the rationale of
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States8
that courts in antitrust cases should be sensitive to the special
facts of professional situations. 9 Moreover, courts have refused
to consider related items as two separate products where the
buyer did not discriminate between the items,50 or where eco-
nomic efficiency and technical quality were significantly en-
hanced by one package.5 1
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of the lower court
that a tying arrangement existed on the record before the
Court.2 The Court, however, found the issue of "functional inte-
gration" to be irrelevant: "the answer to the question whether
one or two products are involved turns not on the functional re-
lation between them, but rather on the character of the demand
for the two items."53 Using this framework, the Court observed
that there was sufficient demand for the purchase of anesthesio-
logical services apart from the demand for hospital services to
identify a distinct product market in the tied product."
Finding a tie under the exclusive anesthesiology contract in
question, the Court, nevertheless, opened the door for uncer-
tainty in regard to other hospital-based physicians. In a foot-
note, the Court indicated that only twenty-seven percent of an-
esthesiologists have a financial relationship with the hospitals,
implying that anesthesiologists, in this respect are different from
other physicians, such as radiologists and pathologists, who are
Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospitals as a Physicians Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REv.
87, 88 (1973).
48. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
49. Id. at 686-87 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778-79 n.17
(1975)).
50. E.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14
(1953).
51. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 242
F. Supp. 852, 855-58 (D. Mass. 1965); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545, 559-60 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See generally Ross,
The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORY L.J.
963 (1974).
52. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1564-65 (1984).
53. Id. at 1562.
54. Id. at 1563-64.
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based in hospitals.58 Given a contract identical to the one chal-
lenged in Hyde, with the exception that radiologists are the con-
tracting physicians, the Court may very well hold that no tie ex-
ists because in the case of radiology there is not an independent
market for the tied services." Each specialty, therefore, may
need to be analyzed separately in order to determine whether it
offers a market separate and distinct from the hospital.
Another uncertainty in the Supreme Court opinion centers
around the tying concept of two separate sellers. An essential
element of the illegal tie in Hyde, according to the Fifth Circuit,
was the economic benefit received by the hospital from the exis-
tence of the exclusive contract itself.5 7 The absence of this
"profit factor" led several courts after the Fifth Circuit opinion
to conclude that no tie exists if, under the terms of the exclusive
contract, the hospital does not share in the anesthesiologist's
profit.58 The basis for this distinction was that in Hyde the en-
tity offering the tying product had an economic interest in the
tied product; that is, the hospital derived a profit from the anes-
thesia services themselves. Generally, most products in a tying
arrangement are offered by the same seller. A tying arrangement
may still be found to exist even if the sellers are separate, so
long as the seller imposing the tie (in this case the hospital) has
some economic interest in the supplier of the tied product or
derives some benefit from the sale of the tied product.59 Never-
theless, if anesthesia services and hospital care are in fact two
distinct products and yet there is no economic benefit to the
seller by the use of the designated supplier of the tied product,
then an illegal tying arrangement does not exist.
Although this "economic benefit" analysis was vital to the
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not even discuss the dis-
55. Id. at 1564 n.36. This distinction finds support in the fact that anesthesiologists
(as opposed to other hospital-based specialists) have direct patient contact, see supra
note 44, and frequently bill separately.
56. See supra note 44.
57. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d at 291-92.
58. See, e.g., Griffing v. Crosby Memorial Hosp., 1984-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 65,854
(S.D. Miss. 1984).
59. Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1979); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930
(1979); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th
Cir. 1977).
1984]
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tinction. In future cases, the existence or nonexistence of eco-
nomic benefit derived by a hospital in the tied product may be a
key element that allows the lower courts to explain away the re-
sult in Hyde.
Economic Power over the Tying Product
Proof of sufficient economic power in the context of exclu-
sive contracts with hospitals is a potentially difficult burden for
the plaintiff. Until recently, this element did not require a show-
ing of domination by the seller of the tying product in the rele-
vant market.6" Rather, the Supreme Court has held that tying
arrangements are illegal if there is merely some "appreciable ec-
onomic power" over the tying product," a standard which does
not require "that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dom-
inant position throughout the market for a tying product.""
Economic power, however, can only be measured with refer-
ence to a specific geographic market for the hospital's services.
The definition of this geographic market 3 will in large measure
decide the issue of economic power. The district court in Hyde
held that the relevant geographic market included an area of at
least twenty hospitals, and therefore concluded that if both pa-
tient and surgeon are free to go to any one of a large number of
competent institutions, the hospital does not possess the power
to force the tied product upon consumers." Other courts have
accepted this reasoning.65 The Fifth Circuit in Hyde, however,
took note of market imperfections in the health care industry:
"First, the prevalence of third party payment of bills eliminates
a patient's incentive to compare the relative cost effectiveness of
competing hospitals. A second market imperfection is the lack of
60. But see Jefferson Parrish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984)
(modifying this requirement).
61. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 611-12 (1977) (Fort-
ner II). See also Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969)
(Fortner I).
62. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. at 620.
63. The geographic market is the area in which the seller competes and where the
buyer would look for a supply of the goods or services.
64. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 513 F. Supp. at 542-43.
65. See Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 1346,
1353-54 (7th Cir. 1982).
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complete information regarding the quality of medical care of-
fered." '66 Because of these imperfections, the court concluded,
patients tend to choose hospitals by location rather than by
price or quality, which means that the geographic market area
may subsume only an individual hospital.7
The Supreme Court abandoned traditional formulas and la-
bels for market power, however, and focused on the actual ef-
fects in the marketplace involved in the case before the Court. 8
While this "hands-on" approach has some inherent appeal, the
effect of this ruling will be to cast doubt on any definition of
market power. The Fifth Circuit in Hyde had found sufficient
economic power because there were market imperfections which
made patients tend to choose a local hospital. The Supreme
Court acknowledged these unique market factors in the hospital
market, yet failed to find that market power existed as it chose
to define the term: "While these factors may generate 'market
power' in some abstract sense, they do not generate the kind of
market power that justifies condemnation of tying.' 9 Market
power only exists, the Court noted, when power over the tying
product "force[s] patients to buy services they would not other-
wise purchase. 7 0 The Court found that the record contained no
evidence that the hospital "forced" anesthesia services on un-
willing patients.7 1 If a patient truly cared about the anesthesiolo-
gist he had for surgery he could choose another hospital where
that anesthesiologist was permitted to work.
Despite its recognition of market factors that indicated mar-
ket power in an "abstract sense," the Supreme Court found no
"real" power over the tying product.7 2 A plaintiff in any tying
case must demonstrate that the defendant "forced" the plaintiff
to buy the tied product. This forcing, moreover, will not necessa-
rily be presumed even if certain formal indicia of market power
are present. The full ramifications of this characterization of
market power are far from clear.
66. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 290-91.
68. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1567-68.
69. Id. at 1566 (footnote omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1567.
72. Id. at 1567-68.
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V. Other Antitrust Theories
As can be seen in this brief overview, there are significant
and difficult issues which remain even after the decision in
Hyde."3 Moreover, the limits of the decision in Hyde must be
stressed. The Supreme Court offered some "guidance" for apply-
ing the tying arangement theory to exclusive contracts between
hospitals and physician groups. Challenges to exclusive hospital
arrangements based upon a tying arrangement claim, however,
have been secondary to a wide variety of other theories which
were not presented for decision in Hyde. Hyde did not deter-
mine with any finality the legality of exclusive contracts with
hospital-based physicians. Indeed, given the complexity of the
economic models in force in the health care field, it will be diffi-
cult to provide any generalizations concerning hospital organiza-
tion and operation, regardless of the legal theory presented in a
given case.
To analyze the various theories which have been, and will
be, asserted against exclusive contracts, it is helpful to consider
the interplay between the interests and powers of the hospital
and the interests and powers of the medical staff. Professor Kis-
sam ("Kissam") suggests three models as a framework for this
analysis. 74
Some privilege questions may be determined entirely by the
medical staff and are referred to by Kissam as the "physician-
cartel" model." One example is a situation in which physicians
are denied privileges because of their association with a non-hos-
pital based health maintenance organization (HMO).76 Here the
physician's interest predomiates and there is little legitimate
need for hospital input.
In situations in which the hospital and staff each have sig-
nificant interests, Kissam terms the model a "joint venture. '7 7
For example, a hospital's decision to require board certification
for staff privileges affects vital interests of both hospital and
staff. While in these circumstances the physician may be pro-
73. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
74. See Kissam, supra note 47, at 611-13.
75. Id. at 611.
76. For a discussion of this problem, see id. at 651-52.
77. Id. at 656-58.
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tecting his own business from competition, the hospital may
have its own independent interest in quality care.
Finally, Kissam presents a model in which the interests of
the hospital in the quality of care or in efficiency of hospital op-
erations appear paramount, while any separate interests of the
medical staff in general are weak.7 8 This "employer hospital"
model 79 includes exclusive contracts because, in Kissam's opin-
ion, the interests of the staff generally coincide with those of the
hospital in promoting quality medical care.80 Thus, the manner
in which any arrangement is characterized under these models
may go a long way toward determining whether anticompetitive
forces are at work.81 The following brief outline of other possible
claims against exclusive contracts should be examined with
these models and concepts in mind.
Exclusive Dealing
The Supreme Court clearly limited the scope of the Hyde
opinion to the specific claim of tying presented in the record
before it. The Court noted, however, that the hospital's contract
78. Id. at 621.
79. Id. at 612, 663.
80. Id. at 612-13.
There are, however, numerous anticompetitive effects which are claimed to result
from exclusive contracts. The hospital may be seeking, for example, to recover a portion
of the professional fee from the physicians subject to the exclusive contract in order to
increase profits and avoid the restrictions of new federal regulations. See Nord, Antitrust
Laws and Exclusive Contracts: Obstacles to Patients' Benefits?, LAw, MED. & HEALTH
CAPE 66, 69 (April 1983).
So, too, qualified physicians are unfairly (it is argued) excluded from facilities to
which they need access in order to work. Thus, physicians must abide by the financial
structure of the favored group (assuming they are invited to join) or they should not be
allowed to practice in the hospital.
81. Kissam is quick, however, to recognize that the unique circumstances and pur-
poses involved in any case may alter the formal categories he has set forth:
For example, the facts surrounding a particular exclusive privileges contract with
radiologists may support characterization of the privilege decision as physician
cartel behavior rather than as an employer hospital decision. This would be the
case if the hosptial can provide no good reason for granting the contract (other
than pleasing the incumbent radiologists) and the radiologists have obtained their
contract by threatening to withdraw their services from the hospital. Our three
forms of privilege decisionmaking are thus intended for use only as organizing
principles, that is, as prima facie assumptions about the appropriate characteriza-
tion of physician-hospital relationships.
Kissam, supra note 47, at 613 (footnote omitted).
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with Roux removed the hospital from the market open to Roux's
competitors. Under traditional exclusive contract analysis the
Court stated: "this contract could be unlawful if it foreclosed so
much of the market from penetration by Roux's competitors as
to unreasonably restrain competition in the affected market, the
market for anesthesiological services. '8 2 While acknowledging
this possibility, the Court made clear that Hyde had "not at-
tempted to make this showing."8" Thus, exclusive contract anal-
ysis was not brought to bear on the facts presented in Hyde.
Exclusive contracts in many different kinds of markets have
been analyzed under a rule of reason analysis.8 4 The fundamen-
tal inquiry under this analysis is what effect the challenged prac-
tice has on competition. In making a determination regarding
exclusive dealing contracts between physicians and hospitals, a
number of factors, including the following, will be considered:
1. the number of hospitals in the relevant market area;
2. the number of physicians covered by the challenged
contract;
3. the dollar value of the commerce affected by the
arrangement;
4. the relative size of the hospital and the physician group
compared to other hospitals and groups;
5. the business justification for the arrangement (for exam-
ple, the hospital's need for an assured source and quality of ser-
vices and the physician's need for consistent employment);
6. the ability of other physicians to practice in the relevant
market area;
7. the initiator of the discussions concerning the contract;
8. the extent of the hospital's commitment of capital
equipment;
9. the physician's compensation (hospital control may sug-
gest hospital concerns with efficiency);"
82. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1568 n.51.
83. Id.
84. E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
. 85. Hospitals have exercised more control over pathologists and radiologists, than
over anesthesiologists. This may be indicated by the manner in which these specialists
are paid. Pathologists and radiologists are frequently paid on a salaried basis, while anes-
thesiologists normally work on a fee-for-service basis.
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10. the length of the contract and procedures.
A court would then weigh all these factors and determine
whether the exclusive contract unreasonably restrains
competition.
It was under this exclusive dealing analysis that the Seventh
Circuit in Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical
Center6 lifted a preliminary injunction that a district court
granted in favor of an excluded anesthesiologist. Although not-
ing that some had argued for horizontal treatment of the chal-
lenged conduct, the Seventh Circuit did not find any evidence
"contradicting the district court's conclusion that the exclusive
contract is an instrument of vertical integration and not a hori-
zontal restraint."87 In order to find a violation of the antitrust
law, the court would need to find "a substantial foreclosure of
competition in an area of effective competition, that is, in a rele-
vant market.""8
In analyzing this relevant market the court in Dos Santos, 9
raised a critical point to be considered concerning the actual
purchaser of the product in question (in this case, anesthesia
services). The court posited that patients generally have little or
no control or choice over the anesthesiologist.90 Thus, it rea-
soned, it "may . . . be more appropriate for antitrust purposes
to treat the hospital as the purchaser ... ."1 On this proposi-
tion, the court made the following analysis: "if the hospital
rather than the individual patient is regarded as the purchaser,
the relevant market could be defined as the area in which Asso-
ciates operates and in which the Medical Center (rather than
the patient) can practicably turn for alternative provision of an-
esthesia services." ' This analysis is, of course, at least arguably
at odds with Hyde," because Hyde implicitly found the patient
to be the purchaser of the "tied" products."
86. 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 1352 n.9.
88. Id. at 1353.
89. 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982).
90. Id. at 1354.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
94. Id. at 1563-65.
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Commentators have supported this rationale to justify ex-
clusive contracts. Kissam, for example, sees a strong, indepen-
dent hospital interest in this kind of privilege decision."5 More-
over, due to the fact that only a limited portion of the medical
staff is involved in the agreement, there is less likelihood of the
"physician cartel" interests bearing on a decision."' Even the
Federal Trade Commission has given its approval to the general
concept of exclusive hospital arrangements.9
In any event, traditional exclusive contract analysis under
the rule of reason may still provide a vehicle for an excluded
physician to challenge such a contract. The specifics of each case
will determine the outcome under the perimeters discussed
above.
Group Boycott
Unilateral refusals to deal with any customer are certainly
permitted under the antitrust laws unless the refusals are part of
an attempt to monopolize. Thus, a hospital's unilateral refusal
to deal with an anesthesia group could not be challenged realis-
tically by the excluded anesthesiologists. Cognizant of this situa-
tion, a plaintiff would allege that the decision to refuse to deal
with him was not merely a unilateral decision of the hospital,
but rather was a joint decision of the hospital, the favored anes-
thesia group, and perhaps the medical staff of the hospital. By
raising allegations of joint conduct amounting to a group boy-
cott, a plaintiff satisfies the plurality of actors requirement of
section one of the Sherman Acte and thereby eases his burden
of proof at trial.
The group boycott claim has the advantage of permitting
analysis under a per se theory. A plaintiff could argue that a
group boycott is presented in a vertical combination among com-
petitors at different marketing levels and is designed to exclude
from the market direct competitors of some member of the com-
95. Kissam, supra note 47, at 665.
96. "The real agreement in these cases is the one between the hospital and special-
ists involved, not among the entire medical staff, and there is, therefore, less reason for
antitrust concern about these contracts." Id.
97. Burnham Hosp., 101 F.T.C. 991 (1983).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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bination." In such boycott cases, "the cornerstone of per se ille-
gality has been the purpose and effect of the questioned ar-
rangement."' 100 Thus, courts have held that the "per se rule is
justified only when there exists the presence of exclusionary or
coercive conduct which, when present, warrants the view that
the arrangement is a 'naked restraint of trade.' ,1l0
Price Fixing
Depending on the nature of the contract between the hospi-
tal and the physician group, an excluded plaintiff may be able to
make a claim of price fixing under section one of the Sherman
Act.' 0' For example, the contract at issue may state a maximum
price for services that may be charged by the physician group.
While price fixing is unquestionably a per se violation, even if
maximum prices are being set, 03 the market analysis in any
given case may show that the hospital is actually a purchaser of
a product rather than a co-conspirator, and is therefore entitled
to set the fee for the product under the contract.'" Thus, there
would not be a horizontal price fixing conspiracy, but rather a
straightforward purchase and sale.
Moreover, courts have not been eager to apply per se illegal-
ity to new or borderline cases. In Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memo-
rial Hospital,05 the court noted that:
the type of conduct alleged as anticompetitive here, denial of
medical staff privileges, could be considered a per se violation
only after the courts have become familiar with that conduct and
any anticompetitive effect it causes. Moreover, although the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly disavowed any professional exemp-
tion from antitrust liability, it has nonetheless consistently indi-
cated that the antitrust laws ordinarily will be applied less
rigorously to professions than to trades and industries.'
99. Klors v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
100. Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. 700,
718 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
101. Id.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
103. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
104. Group Life and Health Ins. Co., v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
105. 572 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. IM. 1983).
106. Id. at 1427.
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The court refused to apply a per se analysis for purposes of sum-
mary judgment due to this lack of familiarity." 7
Another court, however, has noted that if a plaintiff under a
group boycott claim proves the purpose of the agreement was to
drive the plaintiff out of business, the defendant hospital would
be liable under a per se analysis.10 8 This theory, therefore, con-
tinues to have viability for future exclusive contract litigation.
Essential Facility Doctrine
The essential facility (or bottleneck) doctrine provides that
if a facility is unique and essential to a competitor's business,
denial of access to that facility on a fair basis will be deemed a
restraint of trade in violation of section one.109 Hecht v. Pro
Football, Inc."0 is an example of the application of this theory
where access to a football stadium was denied to a competitor of
the Washington Redskins. A facility need not be indispensable
in order to be considered "essential."' This standard may be
met "if duplication of the facility would be economically un-
feasable and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on po-
tential market entrants.11 2 Thus, in the context of health care,
this theory would be more viable in the case of an isolated hos-
pital where no alternative staff privileges are available. A physi-
cian excluded from practice at the hospital due to the contract,
then, would certainly be severely handicapped.
As the court in Hecht"' warned, however, this doctrine
must be very carefully employed: "The antitrust laws do not re-
quire that an essential facility be shared if such sharing would
be impractical or would inhibit the defendant's ability to serve
its customers adequately."' 1 4
107. See generally, Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) for the
Court's analysis of legal standards to apply where defendant is engaged in self-
regulation.
108. Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. at
718.
109. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
110. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
111. Id. at 992.
112. Id. See also Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1320
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
113. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. Id. at 992-93.
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The essential facility doctrine has been asserted in the
health care context, yet, to date, it has not prevailed.11 5 In addi-
tion to the isolation of the hospital and the existence of an ex-
clusive contract, other factors may assist an excluded physician
in presenting an essential facility claim. Other relevant factors
include whether hospital-based physicians are involved in the
exclusive contract, and whether the excluded physician requires
for his practice sophisticated equipment located only at the sub-
ject hospital.
Of course, once the essential nature of the facility has been
established, the plaintiff must still prove he was denied "fair"
access. " 6 In the health care context, this will likely lead to an
evaluation of the basis upon which the exclusive contract was
formed.
VI. Conclusion
The preceding discussion of antitrust theories, other than
tying which may be raised by excluded physicians, is only meant
to describe the key theories which have been raised to date.
Other antitrust theories may certainly be presented in future
cases in which exclusive contracts are challenged. Indeed, claims
have been made (although unsuccessfully) by excluded physi-
cians under section two of the Sherman Act'1 7 for attempts to
monopolize. Claims such as this open up whole new areas for
analysis and discussion.
So, too, plaintiffs may begin to focus more on state court
causes of action. Many state antitrust laws provide a different
basis for analyzing and evaluating exclusive contracts. State
claims may be based on any number of other theories such as
unfair competition or tortious foreclosure. A plaintiff may fore-
close the possibility of treble damages and attorney's fees by
opting for state court, but if entrance into the hospital is the
main relief sought, then either federal or state court may pro-
vide sufficient opportunity for success.
The final point, then, is the recognition that on the basis of
115. Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp. Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. at
719; Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 913 (N.D. Pa. 1981).
116. See supra text acompanying notes 108-10.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
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a tying arrangement, even after Hyde, challenges to exclusive
contracts will certainly continue. A multitude of legal theories
available to plaintiffs were untouched by the Court in Hyde.
Moreover, the myriad factual differences among cases make it
almost impossible for a court to answer satisfactorily the general
question of the validity of exclusive contracts. And as the mar-
ket forces act to create greater demand for hospital privileges,
the excluded will be harder hit and will more frequently seek
judicial resolution of the legality of the exclusion.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol5/iss1/2
